Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, Volume 2,Partie 2

Couverture
E. Frantzen, 1842
 

Pages sélectionnées

Autres éditions - Tout afficher

Expressions et termes fréquents

Fréquemment cités

Page lxxvi - He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length, this which in itself is a particular line is nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever ; so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general. And as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign, so the name line, which taken absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made general.
Page lxxix - IT is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination— either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.
Page lxxxiii - Then as for solidity ; either you do not mean any sensible quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry : or if you do, it must be either hardness or resistance. But both the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses : it being evident, that what seems hard to one animal, may appear soft to another, who hath greater force and firmness of limbs.
Page lxxv - Now if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge, that an idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.
Page xc - For, as we have shewn the doctrine of matter or corporeal substance to have been the main pillar and support of scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of atheism and irreligion.
Page lxxxii - ... ideas, no reason can be assigned why that which is signified by the name spirit or soul may not partake in the same appellation, I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking.
Page lxxix - The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called real things: and those excited in the imagination, being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed ideas or images of things, which they copy and represent.
Page lxxxiii - But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances; which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance.
Page lxxx - As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will; but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived. like to those which are perceived.
Page xlv - Mais s'il y avait des veines dans la pierre qui marquassent la figure d'Hercule préférablement à d'autres figures , cette pierre y serait plus déterminée et Hercule y serait comme inné en quelque façon , quoiqu'il fallût du travail pour découvrir ces veines et pour les nettoyer par la polissure , en retranchant ce qui les empêche de paraître.

Informations bibliographiques